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1 Introduction
HAZOP is one of the safety analysis methods based on sys-
tem engineering.1 It is widely used in chemical processes 
for safety analysis in recent years in China.2–7 In addition, 
it is the most widely used safety analysis method. Howev-
er, it is difficult to reuse and share the safety information 
in HAZOP. This problem needs to be solved. On the one 
hand, the results and records are usually missed and the 
results are difficult to research in HAZOP; on the other 
hand, it is very important and necessary to reuse and share 
the information. The information of safety analysis can be 
used in the full life cycle of a factory including stages of de-
sign, construction, production, maintenance of production 
equipment. At the same time, the information needs to be 
transferred between different units of factory and different 
teams. Non-standard information will cause huge costs of 
human resources and material resources. 
The research on the reuse and share of safety analysis in-
formation has been carried out. The key problem of reuse 
and sharing of information is standardization of informa-
tion. ISO-10303 and ISO-15926 are international stand-
ards about information on chemical processes.8,9 Some 
researchers have begun to research the standardization 
of HAZOP information.10–12 However, the models are too 
complex and difficult to use. Wu proposed a SOM (Scenar-
io Object Model) based on ontology to realize the stand-
ardization of safety analysis information. The problems 
of information hiding and missing can be solved by the 
model. Then, based on the model, computer aid automat-
ic safety analysis was proposed and developed. The safety 
analysis information can be transferred, reused and shared 
effectively.13–15
The problems of safety analysis information transfer reuse 
and sharing have been solved. However, the model needs 
to be improved for on-line safety analysis. The convention-
al safety analysis consists of human based safety analysis 
and computer aid safety analysis. All of them are carried 
out off-line and cannot be used for on-line safety analysis. 
If HAZOP can be carried out on-line, once a fault or ab-
normal event occurs, safety analysis can be done in time, 
the causes of fault can be found, the consequences can 
be predicted in time, and more serious accidents can be 
avoided. It is very useful for the safety of the chemical pro-
cesses.
Some researchers have attempted on-line safety analysis 
by searching results in the database which were obtained 
by off-line safety analysis.16 Obviously, this method is un-
satisfactory. Once a fault or abnormal event occurs which 
is not in the database, the on-line safety analysis cannot 
find causes and consequences. 
A suitable expert system is needed for on-line safety analy-
sis. Deep knowledge model such as SDG (Signed Directed 
Graph) or SOM can represent the relationship between 
causes and consequences. Deep knowledge model can re-
veal the rules of faults development and evolution. It is the 
mathematical expression of interactions of different units 
in the production.17
All the faults caused by deviation can be found by infer-
ence and calculation based on the deep knowledge mod-
el. The diagnosis completeness can be improved and the 
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essential causes can be found using the deep knowledge 
model.18,19
In this article, the scenario object model based on-line 
safety analysis is proposed for chemical processes. Firstly, 
the scenario object model was extended and improved for 
on-line safety analysis. New definitions, rules and proper-
ties such as deviation degree and qualitative trend were in-
troduced into the model. Then, based on the model, new 
inference algorithm was proposed for on-line safety analy-
sis. Once a fault or abnormal event occurs, the causes can 
be traced and the consequences can be predicted. The 
resolution can be improved and can help the operators 
handle the problems in time and effectively.
2 Improved scenario object model 
for on-line safety analysis
The on-line safety analysis needs to carry out inference to 
find possible causes and predict possible consequences ac-
cording to the current states of the system. The core issue 
is the model. The model used for on-line safety analysis 
should satisfy the following requirements:
(1) Complex relationship between variables in chemical 
process, the relationship between causes and consequenc-
es and the states of system in different conditions can be 
stored and represented by the model. (2) The elements 
and rules in the model should be improved to be suitable 
for on-line safety analysis. The analysis resolution should 
be improved. (3) The information should be transferred, 
reused and shared easily in the model.
The improved scenario object model is proposed to satisfy 
these requirements. New elements are added to the con-
ventional scenario object model for on-line safety analysis. 
The structure of the model is shown in Fig. 1.
The model includes event and relationship. The event 
consists of middle event, cause, consequence and safety 
precaution. Compared with conventional scenario object 
model, deviation degree and qualitative trend are added 
to the model to improve the accuracy. At the same time, 
the relationship between events is extended by adding 
qualitative trend relationship to the model. On one hand, 
the new scenario object model has the advantage of the 
conventional scenario object model. The information can 
be easily transferred, reused and shared. On the other 
hand, new elements are added to improve the model for 
on-line safety analysis.
2.1 Definitions of elements 
(1) Middle event. Middle event is used to describe the 
physical state or chemical state of a process such as tem-
perature, pressure, level, flow etc. The states of the middle 
event are described by qualitative state, deviation degree, 
and qualitative trend. 
Qualitative state is described by deviation and guide words. 
The state can be “positive deviation” (“+”), “negative devi-
ation” (“−”) or “normal” (“0”). For example, the state of a 
variable’s temperature, which is higher than normal value, 
can be represented by “positive deviation”. Besides quali-
tative state, deviation degree and qualitative trend are both 
used to describe the state of middle event.
Deviation degree represents the degree to which the event 
or variable exceeds its limits. It is calculated by Eq. (1).
(1)
Scenario object 




















Fig. 1 – Elements of scenario object model for on-line safety analysis
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P is deviation degree, v is measured value, vset is set point, 
vmax is maximum value, vmin is minimum value. The devia-
tion degree is between 0 and 1.
Qualitative trend represents the trend of the middle event. 
Compared with qualitative state and deviation degree, the 
qualitative trend can describe the state in more details. 
The qualitative trend is represented by six basic primitives. 
They are shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2 – Basic qualitative trend primitives
The state of middle event is described by positive state 
(“positive deviation”, “negative deviation” and “normal”) 
in conventional scenario object model. The states of the 
middle event are described in three levels: qualitative 
state, deviation degree, and qualitative trend in the new 
scenario object model. The accuracy of model can be im-
proved. 
(2) Cause. Cause is the reason of an accident happening, 
including device failure, device fault, and wrong opera-
tion. For example, control system failure, pressure regula-
tor failure, instrument failure, value fault, etc.
(3) Consequence. Consequence is the result caused by the 
fault or accident including explosion, fire, device damage, 
decrease of product quality, etc. 
(4) Safety precaution. Safety precaution is used to prevent 
the accident or reduce the loss such as control system, 
safety instrument system and emergency shutdown sys-
tem, etc.
2.2 Definition of relationship between events
The relationship between events is qualitative in conven-
tional safety analysis. It consists of “positive effect” and 
“negative effect”. Its advantage is simple and easy for 
modelling. Its disadvantage is that a too simple relation-
ship leads to low accuracy and poor analysis resolution. 
In order to improve the accuracy and resolution, qualita-
tive trends are used for representing relationship between 
events. The relationship between events is described by 
the six basic trend relationships and their combinations. It 
is shown in Table 1.
The qualitative trend relationship between events can be 
determined by the signs of first-order derivative and sec-
ond-order derivative. 
3 Scenario object model based 
on-line safety analysis
There are two steps for on-line safety analysis. The first step 
is to build the new scenario object model. The second step 
is to do on-line safety analysis once the fault occurs based 
on the model.
3.1 Modelling procedure
The modelling procedure is shown in Fig. 3.
The procedure includes nine steps: (1) Simplifying and 
modifying the model of the sub-system; (2) Dividing the 
system into sub-systems; (3) Analysis of energy flows, feed 
flows, information flows, hazards, dangerous devices, and 
operation points; (4) Listing key middle events for every 
sub-system; (5) Listing influence equations to find the mid-
dle events that have influence on the key middle events; 
(6) Determining the relationships between middle events 
including qualitative relationships and qualitative trend 
relationships; (7) Adding cause events and consequence 
events to the model of the sub-system; (8) Simplifying and 
modifying the model of the sub-system; (9) Connecting all 
the models of sub-systems to build the entire model of the 
process.
Table 1 – Six basic qualitative trend relationships
Trend 
primitive Definition
e: influenced event，c: casual event 
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In the sixth step, the relationship between events is de-
scribed in two levels: the first level is qualitative relation-
ship and the second level is qualitative trend relationship. 
The qualitative trend relationship can be determined by 
the following rules:
(1) The qualitative trend relationship should be deter-
mined according to the rules in Table 1 if the relationship 
between events can be described by algebraic equation or 
differential equation. (2) The qualitative trend relationship 
should be determined by experience if the relationship be-
tween events cannot be described by algebraic equation or 
differential equation.
3.2 On-line safety analysis
The procedure of on-line safety analysis is shown in Fig. 4.
On-line safety analysis includes four parts: data monitor-
ing; identifying states of events; inference according to 
consistent rules; sorting results.
3.2.1 On-line data monitoring
All the variables are monitored in this part. Once a fault 
occurs, the values of some middle events will be above the 
high alarming limits or below the low alarming limits. The 
system is in abnormal state. Then, the states of all events 
will be calculated or identified, forward and backward in-
ference will be carried out to predict the consequences 
and find the causes.
3.2.2 Identification of states of middle events 
The states of the middle event are described in three levels: 
qualitative state, deviation degree and qualitative trend in 
the new scenario object model. The accuracy of model 
can be improved.
(1) Identification of qualitative state
The qualitative states of events are determined by Eq. (2).
(2)
Adding cause events and consequence events to 
the model of the subsystem
Collecting information of the process  
(P&ID, PFD et al.)
Dividing the system into sub-systems
Analysis of energy flows, feed flows and 
information flows
Analysis of hazards, dangerous devices and 
operation points
Listing key middle events for every subsystem
Listing influence equations to find the middle 
events which have influence on the key middle 
events
Determining the relationships between middle 
events including qualitative relationships and 
qualitative trend relationships
Simplifying and modifying the model of the  
sub-system
Have all the  
sub-systems been  
modelled?
Connecting all the models of sub-systems to 
build the entire model of the process
NO
YES
Fig. 3 – Procedure of building on-line scenario object model
On-line data monitoring
Fault occurs?
Identifying the qualitative states of events
Calculating the deviation degree of events
Forward   inference Backward   inference
Predicting consequences and 
propagation paths according 
to one-level consistent rule
Finding causes and 
propagation paths according 
to one-level consistent rule
Finding causes and 
propagation paths according 
to two-level consistent rule
Finding causes and 
propagation paths according 
to three-level consistent rule
Predicting consequences and 
propagation paths according 
to two-level consistent rule
Predicting consequences and 
propagation paths according 
to three-level consistent rule
Extracting and identifying the  
qualitative trends of events
Sorting the propagation paths including causes, 
consequences according to their confidence indexes
NO
YES
Fig. 4 – Procedure of on-line safety analysis
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S is qualitative state, vi is measured value of a variable, 
vhigh is the high alarming limit, vlow is the low alarming lim-
it. “Positive deviation” is represented by “+”. “Negative 
deviation” is presented by “−”. “Normal” is represented 
by “0”.
(2) Calculation of deviation degree
Deviation degree is calculated by Eq. (1).
(3) Extraction and identification of qualitative trends
There are two steps to obtain the qualitative trends. The 
first step is the extraction of trends. The second step is the 
identification of trends. A qualitative trend analysis method 
with a sliding window is used for extraction and identifica-
tion of qualitative trends.20
3.2.3 Forward and backward inference algorithm
The forward and backward inference will be carried out 
after the states of middle events have been identified. For-
ward inference is used to predict the possible consequenc-
es and propagation paths. Backward inference is used to 
find the possible causes and propagation paths.
Forward and backward inferences are both carried out ac-
cording to consistent rules. The consistent rules are used to 
determine whether the fault can propagate from one event 




















Fig. 5 – Three levels consistent rules
One-level consistent rule is based on qualitative state and 
qualitative relationship. Two-level consistent rule is based 
on deviation degree and qualitative state. Three-level con-
sistent rule is based on qualitative trend and qualitative 
trend relationship. If the three-level consistent rule can 
be satisfied, the possibility that the fault propagates from 
one event to another is highest. The targets of forward and 
backward inference are different; therefore, the consistent 
rules are different.
(1) Consistent rule of forward inference
Forward inference is used to predict the states of events 
and consequences. For example, event EB is influenced 
by event EA. If EA is in abnormal condition, the forward 
inference is carried out from EA. The consistent rule is as 
follows:
1  One-level consistent rule
The qualitative state of EB is the product of the qualitative 
state of EA and the qualitative relationship between EA and 
EB when EB is only influenced by EA. It is shown in Eq. (3).
(3)
SB is the qualitative state of EB, SA is the qualitative state of 
EA, RAB is the qualitative relationship between EA and EB.
The qualitative state of EB is the sum of the influences of 
all the events when there are other events that influence EB 
besides EA. It is shown in Eq. (4).
(4)
Si is the qualitative state of EB influenced by event i. N is 
the number of events which will influence EB. The state of 
EB will be “?” if the influences of events to EB are different.
2  Two-level consistent rule
The deviation degree of EB is the product of the deviation 
degree of EA and the qualitative relationship between EA 
and EB when EB is only influenced by EA. It is shown in 
Eq. (5).
DeviationB = DeviationA ∙ RAB (5)
DeviationB is the deviation degree of EB, DeviationA is the 
deviation degree of EA, RAB is the qualitative relationship 
between EA and EB.
The deviation degree of EB is the sum of the influences of 
all the events when there are other events that influence EB 
besides EA. It is shown in Eq. (6).
DeviationB =  Deviationi (6)
Deviationi is the deviation degree of EB influenced by event i.
3  Three-level consistent rule
The qualitative trend of EB is determined by the qualitative 
trend of EA and the qualitative trend relationship between 
EA and EB when EB is only influenced by EA. It is shown in 
Table 2.
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Table 2 – Three-level consistent rule for forward inference
Qualitative trend relationship 
between EA and EB
Qualitative trend of EA
A B C D E F
A A C A F E E
B C B B D F D
C A B C D E F
D F D D B C B
E E F E C A A
F E D F B A C
The qualitative trend of EB is the superposition of the in-
fluences of all the events when there are other events that 
influence EB besides EA. For example, if EB is influenced by 
EA and EC. The qualitative trend of EB is the superposition 
of the influences of EA and EC. The rule is shown in Table 3.
Table 3 – Superposition rule of qualitative trends for forward 
inference
Qualitative trend of EB 
influenced by EA
Qualitative trend of EB
influenced by EC
A B C D E F ?
A A C A ? ? ? ?
B C B B ? ? ? ?
C A B C ? ? ? ?
D ? ? ? D F D ?
E ? ? ? F E E ?
F ? ? ? D E F ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
The state “?” represents that the state of EB is uncertain. 
The rule can also be used for superposition of more than 
two events that influence the state of EB. The possible prop-
agation paths (consistent paths) and consequences can be 
predicted according to the above consistent rules.
(2) Consistent rule of backward inference
Backward inference is used to find possible fault causes 
and propagation paths. For example, event EB is influenced 
by event EA. If EB is in abnormal condition, the backward 
inference is carried out from EB. The consistent rule is as 
follows:
1  One-level consistent rule
The arc from EA to EB is consistent if the product of the 
qualitative state of EB and EA and the qualitative relation 
between EA and EB is positive. It is shown in Eq. (7).
(7)
It is consistent if the Eq. (7) can be satisfied. If the formula 
cannot be satisfied, there will be two conditions: a) if EA is 
influenced by one event, the arc from EA to EB is not con-
sistent; b) if EA is influenced by more than one event, the 
arc from EA to EB is supposed to be consistent. Backward 
inference continues.
2  Two-level consistent rule
The arc from EA to EB is consistent if the sign of product 
of the deviation degree of EB and EA and the qualitative 
relation between EA and EB is positive. It is shown in Eq. (8).
sign(DeviationB ∙ DeviationA ∙ RAB) = + (8)
It is consistent if the Eq. (8) can be satisfied. If the formula 
cannot be satisfied, there will be two conditions: a) if EA is 
influenced by one event, the arc from EA to EB is not con-
sistent; b) if EA is influenced by more than one event, the 
arc from EA to EB is supposed to be consistent. Backward 
inference continues.
3  Three-level consistent rule
Whether the arc from EA to EB is consistent is determined 
by the qualitative trend of EA and EB and the qualitative 
relationship between EA and EB. The qualitative trends “A”, 
“B” and “C” are called “Increase”. The qualitative trends 
“D”, “E” and “F” are called “Decrease”. The arc from EA to 
EB is consistent if one of the two conditions can be satis-
fied: The qualitative trend of EA and EB are the same (“In-
crease” or “Decrease”) and the relationship is “Increase”. 
The qualitative trends of EA and EB are different (one is “In-
crease” and the other is “Decrease”) and the relationship 
is “Decrease”. If the arc from EA to EB is not consistent ac-
cording to the above rule, there will be two conditions: a) 
if EA is influenced by one event, the arc from EA to EB is not 
consistent; b) if EA is influenced by more than one event, 
the arc from EA to EB is supposed to be consistent. Back-
ward inference continues. The possible propagation paths 
(consistent paths) and causes can be found according to 
above consistent rules.
3.2.4 Sorting results 
The possible causes, consequences and consistent paths 
(propagation paths) have been found by forward and back-
ward inference. All the paths will be sorted according to 
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confidence indexes to improve the analysis resolution. 
Confidence index of a consistent path represents the pos-
sibility that the fault propagates along the path. The higher 
the index is, the higher the possibility that the fault prop-
agates along the path. The confidence index is calculated 
by Eq. (9).
(9)
Cpath is the confidence index of the path. N is the number 
of consistent arcs in the path. Carci is the confidence index 
of the ith consistent arc. The confidence index of every 
consistent arc is decided by its consistent level: (1) if the 
three-level consistent rule can be satisfied, the confidence 
index of consistent arc is 3; (2) if the two-level consistent 
rule can be satisfied, the confidence index of consistent arc 
is 2; (3) if only the one-level consistent rule can be satis-
fied, the confidence index of consistent arc is 1.
4 Case study
The scenario object model based on-line safety analysis is 
used for a reactor process. The pipe & instrument diagram 
is shown in Fig. 6.
The description of devices and variables in the process is 
shown in Table 4.
The process is as follows: materials A and B enter into tank 
V101, and then the mix material including A and B enter 
into the reactor R101 through the heat exchanger E101. 
The mix material will exchange heat with water from the 
jacket of the reactor. The heat exchanger is used to preheat 
the mix material. The catalyser enters into the reactor after 
the mix material including A and B enter into the reac-
tor. In the reactor, A and B react to produce D and E in 
the presence of the catalyser. The reaction is exothermic 
so cold water is used to control the reaction temperature. 
The cold water enters into the jacket of the reactor. Part 
of the water is sent to utilities and the remainder is sent to 
heat exchanger to preheat the mix material. The bottom 
material including A, B, D, and E of the reactor enter into 
the flash tank V102 to separate the products D, E, and A, 
which are not entirely consumed in the reactor and will be 
separated into the top of the flash tank for distillation unit. 
The real product enters into the next unit from the bottom 
of the flash tank.
The on-line scenario object model of the above process is 
built using the software called SDGHAZOP v3.0., devel-
oped by us, and the latest version is 3.0. Scenario object 
model including deviation degree and qualitative trend is 
added to the software. The model is shown in Fig. 7. 
The “R” rectangle is the cause event where the fault causes 
are stored. The “C” rectangle is the consequence event 
where the consequences are stored. The circle is middle 
event. The relationship between middle events is described 
in two ways: (1) Qualitative relationship. Real line means 
positive effect and dotted line means negative effect. (2) 
Qualitative trend relationship. The relationship between 
events is described by qualitative trends such as A, B, C, D, 
E, and F, shown in Table 1.
Fig. 6 – Pipe & instrument diagram of reactor process
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Table 4 – Description of devices and variables
Name Description Unit Name Description Unit
P101 pump for material A FI1103 material A and B flow kg s−1
P102 pump for material B FI1104 catalyser flow kg s−1
P103 pump for catalyser FI1105 bottom of the reactor flow kg s−1
P104 pump for material A to distillation unit FI1107 V102 Top flow kg s−1
P105 pump for product FI1201 cold water flow kg s−1
V101 tank for mix materials FI1202 water to heat exchanger flow kg s−1
E101 heat exchanger FI1203 water to utilities flow kg s−1
R101 reactor FI1106 product flow kg s−1
V102 flash tank LI1101 V101 level %
FV1101 valve of material A flow % LI1102 R101 level %
FV1102 valve of material B flow % LI1201 V102 level %
FV1103 valve of material A and B flow % TI1101 V101 temperature °C
FV1104 valve of catalyser flow % TI1102 mix material temperature from  heat exchanger to reactor °C
FV1201 valve of water flow % TI1103 R101 temperature °C
FV1202 valve of water to heat exchanger flow % TI1104 V102 temperature °C
FV1203 valve of water to utilities flow % TI1105 water temperature in the jacket of the reactor °C
XV1101 valve of inhibitor flow % TI1201 water temperature after the heat exchanger °C
FV1105 valve of bottom of the reactor flow % PI1101 V101 pressure kPa
FV1106 valve of product flow % PI1102 R101 pressure kPa
PV1101 valve of material A to distillation unit flow % PI1103 V102 pressure kPa
FI1102 material B flow kg s−1
Fig. 7 – On-line scenario object model of reactor process
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Take the cold water flow decrease for example. The causes 
of flow decrease include controller fault, value fault, work-
er wrong operation, etc. When the fault occurs, the reac-
tor temperature (TI1103) increases. Then the on-line safety 
analysis is carried out. 
The qualitative states of variables are determined by Eq. (2). 
For example, the qualitative state of TI1103 is “+” because 
the value of TI1103 is 96 °C and it is higher than its high 
limit 95 °C. The deviation degrees are then calculated by 
Eq. (1). For example, the value of TI1103 is 96 °C. The set 
point is 94 °C. The maximum value is 96.5 °C. Therefore, 
the deviation degree P is:
(10)
The qualitative trends are also extracted and identified us-
ing a qualitative trend analysis method with a sliding win-
dow.20 The qualitative trend of TI1103 is B. 
According to the states of variables, the possible conse-
quences are predicted by forward inference and the pos-
sible causes are found by backward inference. The result 
is as follows:
Consistent paths found by forward inference: 
TI1103(+/0.8/ ) → Consequences (reaction rate and 
quality of product will be affected; device will be dam-
aged); TI1103(+/0.8/ ) → PI1102(+/0.8/ ) → Con-
sequences (reactor will explode); TI1103(+/0.8/ ) → 
TI1104(+/0.8/ ) → Consequences (quality of product will 
be affected; device will be damaged); TI1103(+/0.8/ ) 
→ TI1104(+/0.8/ ) → PI1103(+/0.8/ ) → Consequenc-
es (quality of product will be affected; flash tank will ex-
plode). 
“+” represents the current state (“positive deviation”), 
“0.8” represents the deviation degree calculated,  rep-
resents the qualitative trend. The possible consequences, 
paths, and trends are revealed by the four paths.
It should be pointed out that forward inference aims to 
predict the possible consequences from the abnormal var-
iable. Therefore, the states of the other variables including 
qualitative states, deviation degrees and qualitative trends 
are all predicted according to consistent rule of forward 
inference. In this case, for example, the deviation degree 
of TI1103 is calculated by Eq. (1) and the other deviation 
degrees are predicted according to consistent rule of for-
ward inference.
Consistent path found by backward inference is as follows:
TI1103(+/0.8/ )←FI1201(+/1.0/ )←Reasons(controller 
fault, value fault, and worker wrong operation). The path 
is the real path along which the fault propagates. The pro-
cess of the fault occurring and its propagation are revealed 
by the path. Backward inference aims to find the possible 
causes from the abnormal variable. So the states of varia-
bles in the path are calculated according to Eq. (1), Eq. (2) 
and the qualitative trend analysis method with a sliding 
window.20
The advantages of on-line safety analysis are shown by the 
example. It can not only find the consequences and fault 
causes in time, but can also predict the development by 
deviation degrees and qualitative trends. The example is 
quite simple. More complex objects, conditions and mul-
tiple faults occurring will lead to many results. In this situ-
ation, the advantages of on-line safety analysis can show 
its advantages including consequences prediction and fault 
causes location, especially high diagnosis resolution (sort-
ing by confidence index).
5 Conclusion
It is essential that on-line safety analysis can be used for 
chemical processes. However, the conventional safety 
analysis is carried out off-line and most of them are qualita-
tive. For this problem, scenario object model based on-line 
safety analysis was proposed for chemical processes. The 
advantages of the method are as follows:
(1) The method is based on the improved scenario object 
model. The transfer, reuse and sharing of safety informa-
tion can be satisfied and the method can be used on-line.
(2) Once a fault or abnormal event occurs, on-line safety 
analysis is carried out to find causes and predict the possi-
ble consequences supplying the instruction for fault treat-
ment. 
(3) Some semi-quantitative information such as deviation 
degree, qualitative trend, etc., have been added to the sce-
nario object model to improve the accuracy of the model. 
Based on the model, on-line safety analysis is carried out 
and the diagnosis resolution can be improved. It is helpful 
for fault location and treatment in time.
How to improve the model according to its application is 
the next research target.
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Sigurnosna on-line analiza kemijskog procesa temeljena na 
scenarijskom objektnom modelu
Dong Gao,a* Beike Zhang,a Xin Xu b i Chong Guang Wu a
HAZOP (analiza opasnosti i operativnosti) metoda je sigurnosne analize koja se primjenjuje u kemij-
skim procesima. Konvencionalne metode za analizu sigurnosti mogu biti ljudske i računalne. Sve su 
to kvalitativne i off-line analize, a sigurnosnu on-line analizu teško je provesti. Za kemijske procese 
predložena je sigurnosna on-line analiza temeljena na scenarijskom objektnom modelu. Scenarijski 
objektni model izrađen je ontološki, čime se sigurnosne informacije mogu učinkovito prenijeti, po-
novno upotrijebiti i dijeliti. Stupanj devijacije i kvalitativni trend pridodani su modelu. Na temelju 
modela i novog algoritma zaključivanja sigurnosna se on-line analiza može implementirati u kemij-
ske procese. Kada se dogodi pogreška ili abnormalni događaj, mogu se pratiti uzroci i predvidjeti 
posljedice. Istodobno se provodi polukvantitativna sigurnosna analiza. Rješenje je moguće poboljšati 
i time omogućiti operaterima pravodobno i učinkovito rješavanje problema. Metoda je primijenjena 
za sigurnosnu analizu reaktorskog procesa te je dokazana njezina učinkovitost.
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